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ABSTRACT
Peter L. Berger’s Early Conception of Agency: Exposition and Evaluation
by
James Greene
Peter L. Berger’s conception of agency in his earliest writings (c.1954 – 1960) is logically and
empirically inadequate. At the root of this inadequacy is an idealism that prevents him from
providing a compelling account of actual empirical agency. Chapter 1 asserts that Berger’s
earlier works warrant analysis. Chapter 2 discusses Berger’s earliest influences, particularly Max
Weber and The Swedish Lund School of motif research. Chapter 3 identifies a unique
commitment to Christian Humanism at the base of Berger’s conception of agency. Chapter 4
clarifies how Berger’s Christian humanism interacts with his Weberian, and Parsonian-inspired
functional analysis of the American religious establishment. The thesis concludes (Chapter 5) by
identifying more specifically how and why Berger’s Christian humanism undermines his attempt
to empirically ground human agency.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Research Problem
The precise nature of the agency-structure relationship remains a contentious issue in
contemporary sociological thought.1 The problem of agency may be formulated as: How shall we
understand the possibility of individual human autonomy and its relation to a complex modern
industrial society? This thesis focuses on how the eminent sociologist and theologian Peter L.
Berger tries to answer that question. Specifically, this thesis claims Berger’s earliest formulation
of conceptions of agency-structure relations evident in his major published writings c. 1954-1961
is theoretically flawed. Berger’s religious and spiritual a priori assumptions prevent his
theoretical system from grounding an empirically discernable agency. The following chapters
identify how Berger’s sociological and theological commitments regarding this spiritual
immediacy leads him to necessarily focus on only those features of human society that are
radically contingent. Ironically, in the end Berger’s idealism leads to an abstractly conceived
social structure whose convictions of production also escape the agent’s own powers and
capacities.
Literature Review
Peter L. Berger’s contributions to debates over “secularization” (See e.g. Harvey 1973:
Hadden 1987; Tschannen 1991; Yamane 1997; Stark 1999; Swatos Jr. et. al. 1999; Weigel and
Berger 1999; Stark and Finke 2000; Norris and Ingelhart 2004; Beckford and Demerath 2007;
Chistiano et. al. 2008), religious pluralization (See e.g. Stark et. al. 1995; Weigel and Berger
1999; Berger 2001: Chaves and Gorski. 2001; Voas et. al. 2002), and religious fundamentalism
1

For a detailed explication of the definition of “agency” see e.g. Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische. 1998. “What
Is Agency?” The American Journal of Sociology, 103 (4): 962-1023.
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(Wiegel and Berger 1999; Berger 2010) are relatively well-known. Scholars generally focus on
his later writing, and have not to date investigate his earliest conception of agency.2 A few
authors have contributed to this debate, however.
Gary Dorrien (2001) specifically addresses Berger’s theological influences and political
interests, focusing on the early 1960s in which Berger’s ethical and moral focus is American
Christianity and is related to a “semi-Kierkegaardian attack on the triumph of the therapeutic in
the churches” (28). Dorrien further critiques Berger’s theology as neo-conservatively motivated.
Bernice Martin (2001) disagrees with Dorrien, however, and regards Berger’s critique as both
accurate and ‘prophetic.’
Nicholas Abercrombie (1986) specifically describes Berger’s intellectual exploration of
agency and autonomy as refreshingly distinct from those various sociologists who have tried to
“rescue the hidden individual dimension but have failed to do so ending in at the level of
structural” (11). Abercrombie further notes that Talcott Parsons’s functionalist system dominated
the sociological discipline, and though the intellectual climate of the 1960s thirsted for a more
robust concept of agency, “this debate like others was pitched at the level of social structure and
tended to ignore the level of individual agency” (ibid., 11). Berger’s own synthesis “generat[ed]
interest in a whole range of newer perspectives from phenomenology to Weber’s theory of
action” (ibid., 11-12). Abercrombie’s analysis however addresses a later Bergerian social
constructionism in the period 1963 to 1970s, one in which Berger’s notion of agency is informed
by the Schützian concepts of the life-world. During this period, Berger uses the life-world
concept as a conceptual “workshop for human meaning” (Ahern 1999: 62-71). Van A. Harvey

2

For commentaries focused on Berger’s general theoretical career see e.g. Ahern 1999; Ainlay1986; Hunter, and
Woodhead et. al. 2002; Fernandez 2003; Wuthnow et. al. 1984.
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(1973) concludes regarding his analysis of Berger’s most well known book The Sacred Canopy
(1967) that Berger presents “human nature [as] almost entirely a cultural product…[and][o]n this
assumption, it is difficult to speak of human nature at all” (90).
Methodology
The research design for this study consists of a conceptual-theoretical analysis of Peter L.
Berger’s earliest conception of agency c.1954 to 1961. The following primary writings are
analyzed: From Sect to Church: A Sociological Interpretation of the Baha’i Movement. (1954a),
“The Sociological Study of Sectarianism.” ([1954] 1984), “Sectarianism and Religious
Sociation.” (1958), “Camus, Bonhöffer, and the World Come of Age.” (1959), “The Problem of
Christian Community in Modern Society” (1960), The Precarious Vision: A Sociologist Looks at
Social Fictions and Christian Faith (1961a), and The Noise of Solemn Assemblies: Christian
Commitment and the Religious Establishment in America (1961b).
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CHAPTER 2
CONCEIVING AGENCY IN SECT AND CHURCH: MAX WEBER AND RELIGIOUS
MOTIF RESEARCH
Peter L. Berger’s (1954a; [1954b] 1984; 1958) theory of agency begins with a fairly
orthodox reliance on Max Weber and a Swedish school of religious studies. His dissertation
modifies and expands on Weber’s church and sect typologies, particularly his analysis of the
reciprocal relation between ‘church’ and ‘sect’ and the undercurrent and/or driving energy-force
associated with ‘charisma.’ Berger also further develops a methodology pioneered by the
Swedish School of motif research to better understand relations of sect and church.3 Unlike later
writings, in these earliest formulations Berger remains cautiously sociological and his idealistic
premise is significantly subdued.
Amending Max Weber’s Concepts
From Weber’s own point of view, it is necessary to get to the inner meanings
behind these phenomena. And since these inner meanings are religious, a
definition is needed that will take the specific religious differentiation into
account 4
Church-Sect Typology
According to Berger, most of the post-Weberian studies relating to sects and churches
were limited to Germanic and European regions of the world and many Weberian-inspired

3

See e.g. Gustav Aulén. [1923] (1973). The Faith of the Christian Church. Trans. E. H. Wahlstrom, Philadelphia:
Fortress Press. Anders Nygrén. [1932] (1982). Agape & Eros. Trans. P. S. Watson. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
4

Berger [1954b] 1984: 370-371.
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scholars erroneously conceive sect and church as radically divergent.5 In contrast, Berger offers
his own rendering of Weber’s concepts. Citing Weber, he asserts that church and sect are
‘political institutions that exercise authority and force upon the laity’ ([1954b] 1984: 368).6 A
sect is a type of organization (Verband) characterized by the fact that it is voluntarily joined by
individuals and therefore coercion and force are rarely exercised. A church, as a type of
institutionalized ruling organization (Herrschaftsverband), however, is “a political institution
with a normative order…which maintain[s] its order by psychological force over a continuing
period of time…granting and withholding sacramental goods” (ibid., 368).7
Berger claims that the Weberian usage of sect is less than adequate, possibly
misinterpreted, and illogical.8 Some scholars consider sect literally as a protest, the root word of
Protestantism, and a type of segregated rebellious group that secedes from the church such as the
Puritans, Lutherans, Baptists, and many early Christian movements. Berger disagrees however.
First, this conception of sect is an inaccurate description in the American case—not to mention
countermovements and other occurrences even within the Catholic church. For example, in
America it would be erroneous to name “present-day Baptists as a sect” as they have become one
of the largest political organizations in America ([1954b] 1984: 370). Second, Christian
5

Berger goes into detail identifying the various flaws he alleges exist in Weberian scholarship on the concepts
church and sect. See, e.g. Berger [1954b] 1984. “The Sociological Study of Sectarianism.” Social Research, 51(12): 367-385.
6

Berger is referencing the incomplete fragments in Max Weber’s Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft [Economy and
Society] (Tubingen 1947, vol. 1, p. 29).
7

It is important to note Berger relies on earlier pre-critical German texts of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft rather than
the modern English renderings. Nevertheless, it is Berger’s Weber that is key and therefore binding.
8

He states: “Although it is true that churches, by and large, possess a hierocratical [sic] order and exercise
hierocratical [sic] force on all within their power, while sects possess no such order and recruit themselves from
those who freely respond to a certain religious experience, we must pry deeper into the nature of both these
phenomena in order to grasp them fully. From Weber’s own point of view, it is necessary to get to the inner
meanings behind these phenomena. And since these inner meanings are religious, a definition is needed that will
take the specific religious differentiation into account” ([1954b] 1984: 370-371).
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communities and denominations also fall into the category of sect; yet these groups formulated
large, bureaucratic church structures rather quickly.
The ‘acute diffusion’ of the Baha’i movement within the Western modern world presents
Berger with empirical clues as to the reconfiguration of church and sect typologies in America.
Based on his analysis of this movement, Berger (1954a) concludes that sectarian movements
have the ability to be much more mobile and less constricted than churches. The unique
characteristics displayed in the Baha’i groups show transference from Islamic to Christian
contexts due their social locality within America and therefore ‘Western consciousness’ (179).
The Ecology of the Sacred and Charisma
The Baha’i movement also provides Berger an opportunity to observe the ‘inner
meanings’ of religious groups in regards to space, which Berger calls an “ecology of the sacred”
(Berger [1954]1984: 375). Figure 1 below illustrates immediate versus mediated agency in
Berger’s early religious theory.
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Groups immediate with
sprit formulate the sect

More agency as there
is immediacy within
the structure

World

Church

Sect

Spirit

(Berger 1954a;[ 1954b] 1984; as modified)
Figure 1 Peter Berger’s Ecology of the Sacred: Immediate v Mediated Spirituality
The sectarian experience for Berger is, in contrast to Weber, not based on voluntarism or
compulsion in membership but rather the experienced immediacy or mediation of spirit
conceived as God’s gifted powers. Sectarian groupings formulate within the church, as well as
without. These sectarian groups experience an immediacy of spirit rather than the church as a
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structure “mediating between spirit and the world” (ibid., 376).9 Closer proximity to immediate
spirit—for highly committed church members and others in smaller bodies of voluntary
adherents—renders religious behavior as deeply spiritual/meaningful within the structure, thus
moving further from a spiritless world mediation. It is the criterion of proximity then that leads
Berger to define sect “as a religious grouping based on the belief that the spirit is immediately
present. And the church, on the other hand, may be defined as a religious grouping based on the
belief that the spirit is remote” (ibid., 374).
Sect is distinguishable from church “for it comes from the inner logic of social-religious
groupings themselves” (Berger [1954] 1984: 368) and is also is an “island formation” that is
distinguished from society as “essentially subjective, unique, and transcendent” (ibid., 374).
Social agents themselves sustain maneuverability and assert their subjectivity within the very
group in which they are derived—the church. A church can be conceptually separated as an
“individualistic, free-flowing spirituality” (Berger 1954a:149) or not, depending on the church
grouping and its relation to the world; sect can either be “transitory” or “lasting” depending on
(for both church and sect) the experienced immediacy of spirit. The positively institutionalized
structures within churches are most likely the cause for the remoteness of spirit and its mediation
with world (ibid., 152), and indeed, the “mediating between the spirit and the world” (Berger
[1954] 1984: 376).
Sectarian agency concerns the “religious object as such” (i.e. salvific-oriented belief and
action) and is “subject in action” (i.e. God’s objectification as spiritual grace) but must occur

9

He states: “By spirit is meant the religious object as such, that object which will always, of course, appear to faith
as a subject [i.e. God, Christ] in action. The spirit may be said, then, to create the religious experience in which man
encounters that which is sacred…The spirit manifests itself to man in a way that can generally be determined
geographically, as it were—in a human being or animal, in certain objects, in a specific holy place sometimes
natural and sometimes artificially created” (Berger [1954b] 1984: 374-375).
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within space, time, and around a spiritual locality (Berger 1954a: 152-153). Most sect/church
typologies, Berger asserts, lack concepts that permit a dynamic analysis of those processes by
which sects transform over time. (Berger [1954b] 1984) explains:
…it becomes clear that [these relationships between church, sect, spirit, and
world] are anything but static in character. In terms of graphic representation, the
center may shift at any moment. The spirit blows where it wills, and at anytime
may manifest itself anew in the middle of what used to be the world, thus creating
a new system of relations. And, significantly, the spirit may also manifest itself
anew within the old and set structure of a church, setting in motion right there the
explosive dynamic of sectarianism (ibid., 376).
Thus we are led to a discussion of the Weberian concept known as ‘charisma.’
Charisma is a force that imbues religious leaders, various groups, or a larger legal setting.
Distinct to the church, sectarian charisma “is attached to the religious leader” (Berger [1954]
1984: 369). He argues that charisma and agency are in a dynamic interplay. “Charisma
represents the sudden eruption into history of quite new forces, often linked to quite new ideas”
(Berger 1963: 949).10 In order to accomplish such an analysis of spirit, Berger employs the
methodology of the Swedish School of motif research.
The Swedish School, Religious Motifs and Historically Tracing Agency
The Swedish School and Religious Motif Research
Berger further deepens his conception of agency by appropriating and modifying a
particular body of thought originating in Sweden known as ‘motif research.’11 A religious motif

10

See also how charisma and its ‘routinization’ can be detected in Israelite prophecy thus amending another portion
of Weberian sociology (e.g. Peter L. Berger 1963a. “Charisma and Religious Innovation: The Social Location of
Israelite Prophecy.” American Sociological Review, 28(6): 940-950.)
11

He states: “We are indebted for our concept of the religious motif to the so-called Lund school of Swedish
theology, especially the work of Anders Nygrén and Gustav Aulén. The Swedish theologians have been interested in
tracing certain dominant motifs throughout Christian history. In this approach they have concerned themselves with
the contents of Christian faith rather than with theological contents proper, in accordance with their view that
theology was not a normative science, but an objective scientific analysis of the contents of faith” (1954a: 159). See
e.g. Aulén, Gustav. [1923] (1973). The Faith of the Christian Church. Trans. E. H. Wahlstrom, Philadelphia:
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is defined as a “specific pattern (gestalt if you wish) of religious experience that can be traced in
[its] historical development” (Berger: 1954a: 159). An adaptation of Berger’s ([1954b] 1984)
motif typology for his analysis of the Baha’i movement is displayed in Table 1.

Table 1 Peter L. Berger’s Sectarian Motifs
Type

Motif

Attitude Toward
World

Enthusiastic: An Experience To Be Lived
Revivalist
Pentecostal

“Fire falling from
Heaven”

World saving

Pietist
Holiness

“Follow the gleam”

World avoiding

Prophetic: A Message To Be Proclaimed
Chiliastic

“The Lord is coming”

World warning

Legalistic

“A new order”

World conquering

Gnostic: A Secret To Be Divulged
Oriental

World irrelevant

New Thought

“Wisdom from the
East”
“Powers in the soul”

Spiritist

“Voices from beyond”

World irrelevant

World irrelevant

(Berger [1954b] 1984: 379; as modified)
Religious groupings exhibit three general motifs that undergo a reciprocally determined
development. These motifs are flexible: they can proceed or succeed one another; a religious

Fortress Press. Nygrén, Anders. [1932] (1982). Agape & Eros. Trans. P. S. Watson. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
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grouping can simultaneously contain elements of each; each represents a phase of ‘routinization,’
where routinization is, for Weber the historical, rational ordering process into traditional or legal
institutions over time (1954a: 149, 170). For example, in his analysis of the Baha’i movement
two fundamental motifs are manifest: prophetic and gnostic (Berger 1954a: 164). The prophetic
motif begins as chiliastic, a fullness of agency, spiritual immediacy, and centered on a
charismatic leader. The legalistic motif involves a disappearance of a religiously charismatic
leadership. Eventually, the motif assumes an ecclesiastical or organized church form. The
gnostic motif also routinizes over time as “monism may develop into complete mysticism and
pantheism, or it may become secularized in a naturalistic conception. The latter is what happened
in the Baha’i case” (Berger: 1954a: 165). The chiliastic motif can initially be prophetic, but due
to routinization it can develop into a legalistic motif and later an ecclesia.
The relationship between the sect and the world is a complex one. We can say,
however, that a change in pressure takes place as the process of “routinization”
goes on…the pressures would seem strongest in the direction from the religious to
the social, that is, the religious motif largely determines the inner social structure
of the sect, as we have described. Later, however, as the spirit recedes into
remoteness and the sect hardens, as it were into ecclesiastical forms, the pressures
predominate in the other direction, from the social to the religious, as the church
makes its peace with the world and is invaded with the latter’s social realities,
norms, institutions (ibid., 157).
In sum, for Berger, a “fundamental motif” remains within and undergirds the patterning of
religious groups, including every church structure that, on the surface, appears overly formalized
and fixed. The motif both modulates and reconfigures the structure in question. Figure 2 portray
the changes in motif pressures over time.

18

Fundamental Prophetic Motif
Chiliastic

Spirit

Legalistic

Ecclesiastic
Ecclesiastical
Form (Church)

Immediacy
(Sect)

Charismatic Routinization Overtime
Figure 2 Changes in Motif Pressures

Berger’s description of sectarian dynamics due to motif pressures is followed by his assessment
of what is called a “meaning system.”
Conversion, Alternation, and Meaning Systems
It is one system among many and only within it exists the illusion of universal
communication. The meaning systems that spring up anew all around us bear the
character of sectarian religion. It is thus no accident that sectarianism proper has
found a fertile field.12
The fundamental motifs project outwardly and combine to structure a ‘meaning system.’
An individual’s meaning system can either constrain or enable agency. Traditional meaning
systems can be taken advantage of by a religious authority to restrict agency. Or an individual
may co-exist among many cultures and therefore navigate “contradictory meaning systems”
arising in the “religious market” that sets up pluralistic situations in which sectarian groups
thrive. The phenomenon of conversion in certain situations creates a possibility that

12

Berger 1954a: 183.

19

“communication becomes impossible” due to not having a “common frame of reference” (Berger
1954a: 182). “Our age is an age of conversion,” Berger claims, and “[c]onversion has taken the
place of communication, the ‘leap’ replaces reason and argument” (ibid., 182).
Alternation, rather than a ‘leap of faith’ (i.e. conversion), a ‘passing from one to another
meaning system’ for Berger replaces reason and argumentation. Alternation, in contrast, is not a
leap but rather a negotiating of meaning systems. Conversion occurs when a totalizing meaning
system is ecologically present; alternation occurs when greater freedom and movement exists in
and between meaning systems. According to Berger, “[a] seedbed of sectarianism” exists when
competing meaning systems, due to the plural market situation of the modern world, facilitates
conversions. Berger’s observation of the Baha’i movement leads him to conclude that while it is
possible to understand alternation theoretically, as seen in his motif research, switching or
alternating back and forth from one meaning system to another is ‘psychologically improbable’
to ascertain empirically (ibid., 182-183).
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CHAPTER 3
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, CHRISTIAN HUMANISM, AND THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL
FICTIONS: THE SOCIAL WORLD AS ALIBI
Berger’s idealistic conception of agency and agency-structure relations first finds
expression in his first major book, The Precarious Vision (1961a). Two core bases for a
conception of human agency are offered: one that uses various social psychological insights to
‘debunk’ societal fictions, but far more tellingly, a second grounded in a type of Christian
humanism that demands radical moral freedom as the individual faces up to his or her own
individual existence.13 In terms of the latter, the question becomes: How is a genuine Christian
authenticity possible in the modern world?
The Social Psychological Structure of Fictions
The Problem with Alternation and Meaning Systems
Berger (1961a) discovers a curious problem when he met adherents of the Baha’i faith for
interviews.14 Adherents became fascinated by the vast amount of knowledge that he had acquired
of their faith and were under the impression that Berger himself was a believer. After Berger
informed members of the movement that he was in fact not a believer the adherents became

13

From 1959 to 1961, Berger authors several essays, on Christianity that address elements of the notion of freedom
and liberation from an ‘inauthentic’ society. This chapter addresses two essays: a two-part piece published April 8th
th,
and 15 1959 for The Christian Century titled, “Camus, Bonhöffer, and the World Come of Age.”
14

Berger (1961a: 124): “The adherents of a sect, upon finding out that the writer had some knowledge of its history
and tenets, immediately assumed that he was a believer. When he identified himself as a nonbeliever, it was as if the
previous information about his knowledge of sectarian lore had been wiped out from their memory. They now began
to tell him the simplest, most commonly known facts about the sect in question. While this mechanism cannot be
called apologetics, it is carried by the same defensive reaction” (Berger: 1961a: 124). Berger also tells this story in a
recent autobiographical account of his writing and accomplishments in his Adventures with Sociology – An “Egohistory” (2009).
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awkwardly surprised and quickly began to challenge Berger’s expertise. From this he realized
that techniques of ‘alternation prevention’ are actually quite elaborate. They consist of practical
techniques, rituals, confessions, theological elaboration and so forth, which are formulated to
deal with doubt, fear, and uncertainty. These systemizations have become vastly more
complicated over time through organized procedures (ibid., 125).
Berger asserts that individuals and groups will go to great lengths to prevent exit from a
meaning system. “Whatever happens, the believer must be prevented from what we have called
‘alternating’ that is, prevented from an ecstasy or conversion which will transport him outside
the system, even for a moment of intellectual inspection” (Berger 1961a: 125). Conversion, for
example, provides new possibilities of agency because one alternates and switches one’s world
view (Weltanschauung). Though this gestalt offers a clue to discovering agency, in fact generally
an individual remains permanently submerged in a meaning system. How does what is in fact
unreal—a subjective meaning system—become overwhelmingly real? In what follows Berger’s
explication of this unique process is described.
The World-Taken-For-Granted
Berger’s (1961a) social psychological analysis of the fictive nature of social reality
begins with an analysis of a Schützian notion of ‘the world taken-for-granted,’ i.e. individuals do
not recognize their productive role in creating, they just presume a world already made. “For
most of us, as we grow up and learn to live in society, its forms take on the appearance of
structures as self-evident and as solid as those of the natural cosmos” (ibid., 10). This form of the
taken-for-granted consciousness creates familiarity, one that does not require thought or
reflection.
Yet this consciousness of what Alfred Schuetz [sic] has called the “world taken
for granted” is not of such solidity that it cannot be breached. When such a breach
22

occurs the world is transformed, takes on new dimensions and colors. If the
breach occurs suddenly it marks the day after which life will never be the same
again (ibid., 10-11).
A breach occurs when consciousness reflects on reality. If this reflection turns to self-reflection
or introspection, the agent’s ‘vision’ of the world then has the potential to undermine fictitious
constraints. Despite the apparent reality of fictions, they still have real social consequence.
Dramatic Play and Precariousness
Berger conceives individuals as actors enacting a fictional play rooted in taken-forgranted consciousness thereby not realizing its fictitiousness.15 When the taken-for-granted
world consciousness is breached, precariousness arises in feelings of uncertainty. This breach in
the taken-for-granted world then forces an actor to realize his or her position in the play. Given
genuine reflection, the actor now sees the play as a masquerade.16 The breach occurs when
someone interrupts the game and calls into question the entirety of its fictitiousness. At that point
actors step outside of the ‘play form’ by no longer adhering to the ‘script.’ For example, consider
a Christian armed for a theological discussion on the “continuum of the sanctified, the saved, the
lukewarm, and the scoffers” (Berger 1961a: 70). Imagine then that the Christian is then informed
that the person to be saved is a Buddhist, Hindu, or Muslim. The taken-for-granted at that
15

Berger (1961a) explains that individuals interacting in the ‘play form’ literally resemble that of playing a game.
They go through their roles, their everyday life, routines, and procedures without reflection (Berger 1961a: 71 also
see e.g. Simmel [1908] 1950: 48). Erving Goffman’s notion of ‘the stage’ further allows Berger to expand this
notion of the ‘taken-for-granted’ social reality. Berger (1961a) especially traces his notion of dramatic play as
society to J. Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (see e.g. Berger 1961a: 233). Berger (2009) also discusses the long lasting
influence of his teacher Albert Solomon who rather enjoyed teaching sociological courses based on reading French
novels of Honoré de Balzac.
16

Berger (1961a): “We may conclude with a picture. If we combine the notion of determination with that of drama
we arrive at a provocative vision—that of a puppet theater. And thus we perceive men running about to and fro on
the stage, going through the motions of the play—all the time with keys turning slowly and predictably in their
backs. But there is one decisive difference between the puppets of society, but with a strange, almost sinister
capacity. For we can stop in our tracks, turn around and look over our shoulders—and perceive the keys turning in
our backs. This act of consciousness is the first step into freedom. That this act is a possibility is the decisive
justification of the social-scientific enterprise” (66).
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moment is breached and causes reflection. While this particular breach did not radically disrupt
the social game, other extreme cases can call into question the entirety of society itself.
In another example Berger (1961a) forces the breach to an extreme through his vivid
description of how WWII European aerial bombings radically disrupted human routines.17 For
example, walking or jogging down a street which is ordinarily an everyday routine. Yet suddenly
one’s awareness of a street, house, traffic sign, sidewalk, or cars swerving on the road is now
radically ruptured. This ‘breach’ in everyday consciousness arises from the display of exploding
buildings, scattered rubble, people screaming, crying, yelling, and the breakout of mass hysteria.
The agent is ripped from a mode of thought presuming a mere façade of the ‘taken-for-granted’
reality. Once presumed, it is now called into question. Insecure feelings at best, and shock,
horror, or trauma at worst now flood an agent’s consciousness. Before such a breach, the street
was not an object of reflection but was assumed as the purely ‘taken-for-granted.’
The Functioning Fiction
Berger (1961a) proposes that the sociological consciousness is intrinsically based in
reflective premises that empower individuals with the freedom to call into question society’s
apparent ‘giveness.’ “What characterizes this perspective more than anything else is the manner
in which it transforms a world which we are taught to take for granted into one that is very
questionable indeed” (ibid., 9). The sociological consciousness conclusively shows that society is
a stage that is far from sturdy. First, Berger is clear in stating that ‘society’ is not a fiction.
Society, Berger states, may be “viewed as a whole, a system of assumptions, conventions, and
procedures shared by a group of human beings” (ibid., 104). It is also the case, as sociological
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Peter Berger was born in Vienna March 17, 1929, grew up during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and
emigrated to New York City in 1946. One can only imagine the horrors he experienced first-hand.
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functionalism presumes, “most of the time, [persons] will act in such a way that the play can go
on” (ibid., 104).18 In the main, people do follow their roles and participate in day-to-day
activities that do not disrupt the stage nor instigate its collapse. However, a deeper social
psychological view reveals what in general sociological functionalism conceals: the stability of
society is actually rooted in the subjective and collective adherence to learned and internalized
roles.
George Herbert Mead, for example, explains that societal roles are internalized within
consciousness in the earliest moments of socialization: “In the process of socialization the value
structure of society becomes the inner value structure of the individual conscience…society no
longer just confronts the child as external reality but has become part and parcel of his inner self”
(Berger: 1961a: 105). Every society universally requires this process for its continuation as the
“purpose of social control is to keep society going despite the occasional foibles and iniquities of
its membership” (ibid., 105). The internalization of roles can sometimes be regarded as an
“invisible cop sitting squarely in the middle of their heads” (ibid., 105).19 Society thus comprises
actors in the taken-for-granted mode, attached to roles ‘constructing projects toward the future’
and perpetuating their own submersion in these roles (ibid., 52). ‘Society’ as a complete object is
finally erected as the ultimate collection and webs of meaning systems arising in and attached to
roles. The individual appears therefore totally assimilated to and submerged in social structure
devoid of agency.
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See especially (1961a Chapter 3, and Chapter 6) for Berger’s examination of and borrowings from several
important thinkers such as Ralph Linton, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, William James, Robert Merton, Max
Weber, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud and Talcott Parsons.
19

This argument represents a synthesis of Mead’s notions with those of Edward Alsworth Ross, Sigmund Freud, and
Talcott Parsons.
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Religion, a uniquely powerful subset of this institutional combine, for Berger, is the
epitome of such control. Berger offers witty examples, funny scenarios, stories, historical
anecdotes, and a wide-ranging discussion of how unreflective agents reproduce social fictions
without awareness of their own genuine powers, and as facets of a fictional conjuring such
phenomena as capital punishment, law, marriage, power, politics, religion, norms, routines, and
rituals. Such apparently objective facts as ‘society,’ ‘roles,’ and ‘functions’ in fact, while
exhibiting costumes and masks, conceal the “magnificent fakery on the rest of the cast” (Berger
1961a: 80).20 These rules, norms, or scripts are followed without knowing why they should be
followed in the first place.
Berger concludes by noting that an emancipatory insight can be derived as a consequence
of this sociological ‘debunking’, i.e., “we…contend that this attitude is not a one-sidedly
oppressive one. It also has a liberating side” (ibid., 84). This awareness is liberating because this
knowledge arises from our self-reflection: it depends on us as thinking beings. Realizing that
“the oracles are ghostwritten by nervous little men who copy from each other” may be
disconcerting, yet may be the most rewarding since we after all are the authors of “our own
knowledge” (ibid., 84).
The Realization of Social World as Alibi: Stepping Outside of Society and into Individual Human
Existence
Berger’s social psychological description of society as fiction unearths a type of human
authenticity that is compatible with that discovered by philosophical existentialism. Berger’s
social psychological conception of bad faith is defined as follows: “Bad faith means that society
20

He states: “As soon as we get beyond the strictly technological aspects of society, there are few of its aspects that
cannot be sharply illuminated in this comic perspective of fictitiousness. Whether one looks at the world of learning,
or the world of power, or the world of religion—everywhere one will find actors carefully masked and costumed to
put over some magnificent fakery on the rest of the cast” (Berger 1961a: 80).
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assists us in hiding our own actions from our awareness. The role becomes a moral alibi” (1961a:
89) and the actor “excuses himself by pointing to his social role and to the ideologies in which
the role is enveloped” (ibid., 89).21 With bad faith an actor in the taken-for-granted play uses
‘society as an alibi’ and does not question whether social reality is fictional or detrimental to
human existence. Bad faith is endemic to all cultures within which individuals posit blame on a
societal role or society generally rather than free moral choice.
Berger’s description of capital punishment via the electric chair provides his most vivid
accounts of the operation and moral consequences of bad faith. Societal roles are wielded so that
no one will have to assume responsibility for the actual murder of a fellow human being. “No
matter what method of deceit is finally used in the execution itself, it is a lie that nobody is doing
any killing…This is the reality. The rest is fiction, mythology, alibi” (ibid., 88). He provides
another example of a Russian spy captured by the German army who studies the German war
manual to learn of the proper way to die as a prisoner, more so he could enact the role of ‘dying
by the book.’ The officer who shoots him could then remark that he ‘died well’, ‘brave’, and so
forth. On the other hand, one may observe the taken-for-granted bad faith whereby the officer
gains respect for his victim and justifies his role as executioner. The victim also immediately
attaches to a societal role; in this case the standard and ‘proper’ manner of death for a war
prisoner. Both executioner and prisoner attach themselves to a societal alibi: “[B]ad faith is not
an alibi from guilt but rather an alibi from terror. Both torturer and victim are in bad faith” (ibid.,
91).
The most “terrifying aspects of existence” are also “avoided” through bad faith (Berger
1961a: 95). Following Heidegger, Berger deploys the notion of “das Man” to refer to a social
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Berger modifies Sartre’s term “bad faith” to denote an actor submerged in a taken-for-granted societal role
maintained as moral alibi.
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generality “Man” or “mankind as such,” thus evacuating and extinguishing the particulars of
each individual’s existence. The finality and terror of death is thus avoided: not an individual
terror to be faced in a unique way, but as an abstraction applicable to “humanity as such.” For an
example of generalized versus individualized finality of death, Berger points to a funeral he
attended following World War II involving a tragic death of a Jewish child in which the rabbi
stated ‘this is not the time for another Jew to die.’ This implies that we all die as something, in a
role that “becomes a fiction which vicariously dies for them” (ibid., 97).
Only men die. Their anguish, their terror, and their courage cannot be captured in
the social categories. Perhaps the deepest obscenity of society lies in the fact that
it continues to try. Unlike their mammalian relatives, few men are permitted to die
“off stage.” To the last moment the social comedy continues all around them, and,
what is more, they are expected to participate in it (ibid., 97).
Humans hide from their particular existence, by pretended occupancy of a universal role or
category. In radical contrast, Berger writes that an individual will experience authentication only
when embracing the ecstasy (ekstasis) of “really confronting existence.” This is precisely that
precarious liberating sociological consciousness that allows one to ‘step outside of oneself.’22
Generalities (e.g. ‘das Man,’ ‘societal role’) require that a person die as something. In this way,
consciousness is structured to prevent genuine reflection on one’s agency. However, nonreflection is a fictitious, yet real, constraint.
Society provides from birth to death one’s roles, categories, placement, names, and
identifications. Playing entirely within the freedom provided by these roles makes for a “flight
22

“However, it is not only this one terror which can be avoided in this way. The same is true of any experience of
ecstasy, using that term in its original meaning of ekstasis—standing outside oneself. There are various situations in
life in which it may suddenly seem to us that we have stepped outside the everyday course of events, that we are
really confronting existence. This can be an experience of terror, though it need not always be. This writer has not
fully understood why Heidegger gives such a privileged status to the one ecstasy of confronting my own death.
There are other ecstasies of horror, awe, guilt, but also of sudden insight, pleasure, joy. What all ecstasies have in
common is breaking through the routine, everyday, taken-for-granted course of our life. Society functions to prevent
this break-through. It is especially its fictions which are designed for this purpose” (Berger 1961a: 96).
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[into] bad faith…[and] to live in accordance with one’s dramatic assignment” (Berger 1961a:
98).
What all these instances of total identification with a role have in common is the
avoidance of ecstasy. These individuals never confront the universe as men,
nakedly, openly. They always hide in the costumes of the social carnival. They
cannot face the world except as officers, priests, political devotees, insurance
salesmen, or faculty wives. That is, they cannot face the world at all (ibid., 99).
Berger, finally, applies this conceptualization of ‘bad faith’ to the church. The church and
religion in general provide an individual ‘leap’ not into faith but into a religious ghetto (ibid.,
181). The ‘church’ is very much a place where someone hides and masks within a total meaning
system, the ultimate moral alibi within an “okay world” of explaining ‘everything as alright.’
This social world is a “village” erected to provide the “illusion of sanctity, safety, sanity, and
order” (ibid., 125).
For in reality man does not live in an “okay world” at all. He rushes toward his
own death on a course marked by indecipherable signs and surrounded on all
sides by a darkness full of pain. He can become authentically human only if, in
some way, he faces and comes to terms with this destiny (ibid., 121).
The all-encompassing meaning system in the “okay world” prevents the very leap out of bad
faith that would permit “ecstasy or conversion which will transport him outside the system, even
if only for a moment of intellectual inspection” (ibid., 125). The web of meanings in religion
makes possible a moral community that is quite possibly essential to social solidarity (ibid., 103),
yet this is also characterized by alibis, bad faith, and precariously elaborated scaffoldings fitted
for an “okay world.”23
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He states: “One does not have to be an existentialist to perceive that existence lurks with terrors. Thrown into the
world in one brief moment of consciousness, we are surrounded on all sides by mystery which includes our own
destiny and the meaning of a universe not too obviously constructed for our comfort. From the first reassuring smile
of the mother bending over a frightened infant, society provides us with structures in which we can live with a
measure of ease and which announce to us every day that things are in order. Busying ourselves at the warm, well-lit
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Existential Freedom and the Warranted Critique of Christianity Informing Christian Humanism:
Camus and Bonhöffer
Many times religion is an “operation of bad faith from beginning to end” (Berger 1961a:
125). “Religion is needed in society because men need bad faith. The paradigm of the social
function of religion is the sword of the executioner at Freiburg” (ibid., 125). The anti-religious
critique, for Berger, therefore contains a valid debunking consciousness.
Berger (1959a) applauds the French atheist-existential philosopher Camus for his
penetrating, valid critiques of Christianity yet also surprisingly as a means of also defending
Christian truth. Camus’s radical positing of a world stripped of metaphysical meaning and his
several valid insights into the problem of Christian theodicy retain validity against those whose
faith finds in God the ultimate moral alibi. Camus criticizes the Christian faith because it allows
someone to easily rationalize suffering, specifically “innocent suffering” (418). “The Christian
eschatology accepts injustice by pointing to eternity and to the suffering God on the
cross…[which] make[s] men accessories to murder” (ibid., 418). Camus continuously draws on
capital punishment themes where everyone affiliated with such an act are “accessories to
murder” which Berger further extends by noting, “[t]here is an awful affinity between priest and
hangman. That the symbol waved by Christian priests before countless victims of Christian
torture is itself an instrument of execution may be grounds for reflection” (ibid., 418).24
Second, Christianity as church sanctions disagreement with the status quo. It requires a
“sacrifice to a political creed” (Berger 1959a: 418) where the Christian religious establishment

spots of the marketplace we can forget the howling visions of the night. Existence is leaning over a bottomless
abyss. Society is the Potemkin village that shelters the abyss from our fearful eyes” (Berger 1961a: 97).
24

It is noteworthy that The Precarious Vision (1961a) is similarly obsessed with the theme of capital punishment.
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supports political rhetoric, approves war, and has messages preached behind pulpits for social
issues, possibly even political sway in the voting booth.25
Berger, apparently unconvinced of, or unwilling to fully embrace Camus’s atheistic
existentialism, uses his negation of Christian bad faith and instead directs it against the
institution of religion. In short, Berger (1961a) indicts the precarious scaffolding that religion
affords the individual in contemporary society just as he earlier indicts the notion of society as
alibi. The Christian religion in the modern world, or any religion for that matter, comprises
persons comforting themselves in an “okay world,” wrapped in a moral alibi, and acting on the
basis of a fictitious meaning system. Humans are still dealing with existence, death, and hope for
life and the joys of life. This joy is ecstasy (ekstasis) and the first steps into freedom. For Berger,
ecstasy as agency debunks society as a fiction, and a man as ‘das Man.’ The ‘precarious vision’
then in its fullest meaning is manifest as consciousness radically stripped of a metaphysically
derived existence. Christianity devoid of its institutional comfort forces a confrontation with
human moral autonomy.
Camus’s final critique of Christianity centers on the concept of guilt. Jesus in the Gospels
seems “melancholy” possibly due to the “guilt of God” (Berger: 1959a: 418). Moreover, “Jesus
is guilty of the massacre of the innocents…the children of Bethlehem are dead, while he goes on
living…the death of the Christian martyrs, and of all those martyred in turn by the new religion”
(Ibid., 418). Considering that a “bystander” is guilty by allowing murder to occur, this implicates
the idea of “God [as] the eternal bystander” (418). Camus’s critique places on the table the
fundamental question: Can a Christian be ethical and moral? Camus even questions whether or
not a Christian could even exist as a decent human being.
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The Noise of Solemn Assembles (1961b) provides a much more elaborate discussion.
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It is Dietrich Bonhöffer who provides for Berger (1959b) a Christian response to
Camus’s anti-religious critique. Bonhöffer clarifies the terms of a new Christian ethic that can
withstand these withering criticisms.26 At present, the church does not project an image of joy
but of gloom, doom, and sorrow. These are leveraged so that the church emerges as a place of
therapy and a safe-zone (an “okay world”) amidst the evil, modern world.
Camus and Bonhöffer each furnish Berger elements of a ‘this-worldly’ approach, yet
Camus inconsistently (unlike Bonhöffer) adheres to the notion of the ‘absurdity of human
existence.’
The absurd was for Camus a starting point, not by any means the culmination of
his thought. Moreover, even during this period he sounded a strong affirmation of
life, the simple life of this world and this world only…This affirmation is a
continuing theme. Camus passionately defends the ultimate validity of
joys…Friendship and conversation, an open sensuality without guilt, swimming
in the sea, the touch of the evening’s cool breeze when the day’s work is done—
these are joys that all men can share, the joys of this life, the only real joys.
Supernatural hopes are a betrayal of this common world of men and thus of
humanity itself (1959a: 417).
For Berger, God addresses man as a human of His creation, not as the societal alibis man
has created for himself. When God addresses man, he addresses him as a particular, finite human
being. When man participates and masks moral agency by belief in the fictions, he becomes even
more radically disconnected from God.27 Christian humanism
…means to ground all moral imperatives in men and not in institutionalized
fictions. It means to see through the deceptions of social structure, through the
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Bonhöffer’s authenticity as a model contemporary Christian theologian significantly derives his involvement in a
resistance movement against Hitler during WWII. He wrote several letters after his arrest by the Nazis and was
executed in the Flossenbürg concentration camp on April 9, 1945.
27

He states: “Bonhöffer would have us stop thinking of secularization as primarily a turning away from God. He
would have us think of it as revealing God’s gift of freedom and of the world to man. Here we may use the Jewish
concept known as tsimtsum or contraction: God created the world by contracting so that there was room for it. The
act of creation was an act of renunciation on God’s part. We can understand secularization as part of God’s
tsimtsum” (Berger 1959b: 451).
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web of bad faith and rationalization. There is a very great liberation in acquiring
such perception, though even this liberation pales compared with that which
comes from God's eternal recognition of ourselves (Berger 1961a: 229).
Berger’s Christian humanism, immensely important to Berger’s conception of agency in the
modern world, thus aligned with a ‘this-worldly’ existence as displayed in the following figure.

Christian
Humanist
Typology

Social
Existential/AntiPsychology Religious
Typology

God

No God

Creates humans with
Radical Freedom

Humans exist, must
face existence, death
and one’s own
individually.

Social Fictions
and the Moral
Alibi
Masks Radical
Indeterminacy

Man
Radical indeterminacy
(Freedom)

Society
Man view society
as contingent

Figure 3 Christian Humanism aligned with the Existentialist Anti-Religious Critique
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CHAPTER 4
THE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA: THE NEW ETHIC AND THE
FUNCTIONAL RELIGIONS
This chapter explicates Berger’s critique of the American religious establishment.
Underpinning his analysis is a conception of the agency-structure relation deriving from his
previous research. It involves such major themes as the routinization of charisma, motif research,
existentialism, and Christian humanism.
The New Ethic and the Religious Establishment in America
Economic and Social Forces
Modern industrial growth in America is the principal causal context influencing the
contemporary church and the individual believer, including especially its rapid societal,
technological, and cultural consequences (Berger 1961b). American society in the early 1960s
arose as a major force in world affairs, with Communism and developing ‘Third-World’
countries as emergent concerns. Other ‘revolutionary’ forces were also changing the American
societal landscape. Medical advances, psychiatry, television, advertisements, and powerful
marketing strategies, all were effectively re-shaping behavior on a mass scale. “[T]he impact of
the new media of mass communications,” Berger asserts, “[is] functioning as immensely
powerful molders of consensus throughout the society” (ibid., 40).
The post-World War II era was characterized by problems of over-production, and a shift
into a mass consumption-driven economy. Revolutionary economic forces were altering
circumstances in fact, and in “consciousness” (Berger 1961b: 28). Technological advances,
increasing goods, services, and standard of living; rising affluence, mobility, and freedom, all
revolutionized the American scene. On the other hand, there are many unintended consequences
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arising from “the ever more rapid transformation of our society, often in directions that we can
but imperfectly foresee” (ibid., 24). This “economic revolution” can be a “vicious cycle, except
that few [of its beneficiaries] would be disgruntled enough to call this relationship vicious”
(ibid., 23).
The Secular/Religious Continuum and the New Ethic
Berger (1961b) focuses his analysis on the condition of American public and private life,
noting in particular the “secular versus religious paradox.” This paradox drives, he asserts, the
very behavioral “logic” of the individual. The religious sphere seems that it is radically separated
from the secular. He defines secularization as follows:
…the term refers to a segregation of religious motives within the [confines of the]
religious institution itself. Within the broad areas of political, economic, and
social life, religious motives appear to be of little relevance. The logic of policy
and decision-making in these areas is overwhelmingly secular in character” (ibid.,
34; emphasis added).
What is most noteworthy is a “paradox that the religious establishment (and, for that matter, the
religious renaissance of recent decades) is to be found in a highly secularized society” (ibid., 34).
This paradox is explained by Berger as rooted in the fact that religious life is both “irrelevant”
and “functional”: it serves economic forces, consumption, and integration of conformist beliefs
and values and is therefore “passive rather than active.” Religious life is “acted upon rather than
acting” (ibid., 93). Two different logics compete and motivate the individual’s behavior within
and without the church.
The reality, of course, is that the person listening to the minister in church is a
radically different one from the person who makes economic decisions the next
day. When our typical church member leaves suburbia in the morning, he leaves
behind him the person that played with the children, mowed the lawn, chatted
with neighbors—and went to church. His actions now become dominated by a
radically different logic—the logic of business, industry, politics, or whatever
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other sector of public life the individual is related to. In this second life of his the
church is totally absent (ibid., 37).
In other words, acts that occur in routinized everyday secular life have come to define
religious life and have crystallized into a religious establishment. Paradoxically then, Berger
(1961b) examines the religious establishment, institutions, communities, and finally individual
believers. His conclusion: religious groups and individuals are solemnly complacent participants
in societal structures. These assemblies are no different than other secular institutions. Because a
revolutionizing industrial and technological dynamism has great impact on each, secular and
religious institutions have in effect become overly conformist and now control individual choice.
Berger locates this collapse of genuine religiosity in the eclipse of the Protestant spirit.
The Early American Protestants exhibited a ‘this-worldly’ ethic. Hard work and frugality were
viewed as vehicles to propitiate the supernatural. Berger now observes a different ethos
underwriting a shift from production to the consumerist “economy of abundance” (ibid., 28) that
radically differs from the older ethic asserted in Max Weber’s famous analysis. “There can be
little doubt” Berger asserts, “that American culture, despite all its Puritan vestiges, is veering
away from such ‘asceticism.’ The ongoing of the advertising industry with the remnants of a
thrift-oriented economic ethic gives us a vivid picture of this—and the conviction that advertisers
are going to be successful!” (ibid, 28). Cultural symbols once saturated in a supernatural aura
have dissipated. God appears now only in times of extreme despair, danger or extreme crisis,
thus calling into question a standard sociological definition of religion, as a persistent
‘preoccupation with the supernatural’ (ibid., 42).28

28

He states: “In the former case, [i.e. the classical Protestant ethic] the ethical emphasis was indeed thisworldly…but this ethic was meaningful only against a background of intense preoccupation with supernatural
realities. Today, the supernatural has receded into a remote hinterland of consciousness, mainly to break forth in
moments of personal crisis, while the this-worldly ethic has remained with a vengeance. Indeed, if religion were to
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In this new ethic, emphasis is placed on conscience, and emotional appeasement rather
than supernatural appeasement. Emphasis on harmony and equilibrium are now expressed in
community gatherings where American values compare analogously with Confucianism, a ‘way
of the middle’ (Berger 1961b: 48-49).29 The harmonious ethic of equilibrium now suppresses
metaphysical concerns with the sacred. A ‘common faith’ has generalized religion as morally
and psychologically appeasing value-sets.30 Religion devolves into cultural concerns and is
segregated as leisure activity. American culture shields and masks all signs of discord and
suffering as children socialized in suburbia are comparable to a child who has been picked to be
the new Buddha, to be protected from disclosure suffering, pain, or any forms of worldly
discomforts (ibid., 48). This new ethic disseminates individuals into a structure lacking agency.
American cultural values are integrated by the church and function to shelter adherents
from the terrors of the world. Evil, suffering, pain, and encounters with the supernatural, are
viewed as forms of pathology that must be quickly cured in order to bring an individual back into
harmony. God is relegated to the farthest reaches of the universe, and the deepest pathological
concerns of the mind. The new ethic also reflects consumerist affluence generalized in a
common faith and community value system. Moral conduct no longer struggles with core

be identified with some sort of preoccupation with the supernatural, then what is said and done in most of our
churches can hardly be given that name at all” (Berger 1961b: 42).
29

He states: “For, if human existence could be said to have a day side and a night side, then American values
strongly emphasize the former against the latter. In this respect, American culture has a rather striking resemblance
to that of Confucianist China, where the metaphysical concerns were also suppressed in the sane, sensible conduct of
one’s practical life…Such a cultural “way of the middle” (to use a Confucianist term) will attempt to avoid any
experiences of ecstasy, that is, any experiences where men may step outside the routine of everyday life and
confront the terrors of their condition…Death cannot be faced and therefore must be denied. But the denial of
metaphysical concerns is not limited to the extreme fact of death. Our culture shields us effectively from all visible
signs of suffering and degradation” (Berger 1961b: 48).
30

Will Herberg coins the term “common faith” and Martin Marty similarly wields a notion of “religion-in-general”
(Berger 1961a: 41).
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metaphysical questions. In sum, the American religious establishment is viewed by Berger as an
institutional expression of an over-arching post-WWII conformist American value system. This
system prevents an individual from stepping outside of everyday-life routines; hard work and
frugality have been replaced by competition, success, and secular activism. Business, churches,
political, and educational institutions all contain these same conformist values. (Berger 1961b:
43).
The Functional Religions
The functionality of the secular realm (e.g. economic, cultural, political, and social)
perpetuates complacency in the religious realm. The most important function of religion
therefore is to reproduce symbolic integration thereby facilitating social integration.31 Religion
sustains and reproduces structural-institutional existence. It provides a conformity that explains
“the cohesion of the American value system” and why that cohesion has “increased rather than
decreased” in religious communities (Berger 1961b: 40).
Second, there is an “intimate relationship between religion and the state” (Berger 1961b:
58) in America despite protestations to the contrary. The nation was founded as a religiously
inspired republic. Many, if not all political candidates must insert religious language—oftentimes to affirm their Christian bona fides. To appear as an atheist or agnostic (much less another
faith altogether), or to use excessively secularist rhetoric would very much disrupt the “political
marriage” (ibid., 60). This ‘common faith’ and political religion presumes adherence to those
Judeo-Christian values that politicians never fail to mention. Political parties ceremonially begin
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Berger is indebted to Parsonian functionalism in this regard. See e.g. Talcott Parsons [1937]1949. The Structure of
Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers. Illinois: The
Free Press. Talcott Parsons 1951. The Social System. Illinois: The Free Press. Especially see e.g. Talcott Parsons
1960. Structure and Process in Modern Societies. Illinois: The Free Press.
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their conventions with prayers, moments of silence, and speeches rhetorically sprinkled with
religious symbols. These moral fictions become social placeholders.
A vast array of state-issued political incentives to religious groups is provided, such as
tax-exempt status. Successful religious entrepreneurs amass significant capital in property and
other investments. Non-profit organizations actively promote welfare and well-being in their
surrounding communities, society, and the world at large and resemble purely secular groups that
also focus on the needy. Military chaplains must honor and uphold secular rules, thereby
securing pay and benefits from the government. Clergy may even receive state training if in the
worst war-time scenarios they are called upon to provide emergency and spiritual assistance to
the laity. Postage stamps, money and other state-issued materials quite often contain religious
imagery. Educational institutions often socialize children using a healthy dose of ‘civil religion.’
Effectively, then, this political religion continuum may be interpreted as a form of social control
(Berger 1961b).
What Berger calls ‘social religion’ reinforces “status symbolism” thereby reaffirming
political and cultural religions (Berger 1961b: 73). Churches are often segregated by both class
and ethnicity thus mirroring social class structures. Class and race are divided in the churches
characterizing this “cultural tone” and “faithfully mirror…class prejudices” (ibid., 89). Often
racial prejudices creep into these meaning systems due to the preferences of the church laity
themselves, for example, whether or not desegregation is warranted. In local church communities
there exists homogeneity and class exclusion, and at the macro-level are definite divisions
between middle-working and lower-classes thus mirroring social “class dynamics” (ibid., 82-83).
Lower classes aspire to participate in a middle-class value system, and the middle-class, to
perpetuate mainstream cultural and political values. Those who most often have “a stake in
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society and the community” are also in a position to maintain the church status quo comprised of
‘pillars within the community’ that already occupy high-level positions in secular life, and
oftentimes they become clergy (ibid., 84-87). Sanctioning comes about when non-conforming
deviants conflict with middle-class values of respectability and class homogeneity; other values
include honorability, responsibility, respectability, success, and activism.
At the center of this cultural perpetuation is the middle-class who furnish values
upholding the status quo, including political beliefs, rhetoric, and other activities of sociopolitical relevance. And of course the pulpit itself is not immune to such means of integration
and social control. Ministers as members of a class-based value system avoid conflict. If the
clergy observe no conflict and the laity appears happy and pleased it assumes the message must
be correct. Theology and liturgical practices are constricted by social group conformity.
Everyday individual religious life is easily comparable to business, office, and day-to-day
life routines. Church life is office life with “a peculiar affinity with the business community”
where lay leaders are “also successful in the economic world” (Berger 1961b: 85). Theological
rhetoric must remain “popular with the laity,” and uphold the “common views” (ibid., 85); and,
unpopular politics, morals, or messages that disrupt the integrated value system of the church are
usually proscribed. Social religion functions as conformity, success values, political control, and
a middling ethic of harmony and solemnity and prevents breaches.
Finally, a type of ‘psychological religion’ is characterized by sheer promotion of ‘wellbeing.’ Religious institutions are then viewed as a means to achieve individual psychological
security and promote an overall symbolic integration (Berger 1961b: 93). Religious
psychological models provide individuals with coping mechanisms for “minor and major crises”
and are “conducive to mental health” (ibid., 96). An ‘O.K. world’ religion dispels these
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“psychological anxieties” (ibid., 97) in a manner similar to the Freudian “psychotherapy
movement” (ibid., 97). Clergy even are trained in psychology and counseling in order to provide
therapeutic solutions confronting the laity. Because “the answer” is within the churches,
individual believers are relieved of agentic powers; they have now become functionally
integrated with those forces becoming ossified, general, and common. Christianity has become
isomorphic with these societal forces and no longer a radical spiritual reflection rooted in moral
autonomy. Religion as a structure in American society functions to avoid terrors and occasional
mishaps and furthers a routine in which the individual adjusts to normative expectations, rules,
and roles.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND SPECULATIVE REMARKS
Peter L. Berger focuses his conception of agency upon the ‘inner’ transcendent meaning
given to the religious object as such (spirit) by social actors. More importantly, it may be
inferred that Berger conceives agency as the ability to move through time and history outside of
routine, i.e. as unmediated spiritual encounter. Over time, his motif typologies predict the
routinization process: the when and how of the group dynamics leading to formal patterning. His
discussion of the World War II-era over-formalization and restriction of individual freedom
echoes Max Weber’s broader rationalization thesis. For Berger, the “sect” represents an
attempted exit from the mainstream social world, yet still its patterning eventually inhibits
individual or group agency and its “fundamental motif” is tamed by structure and history. Time
simultaneously restricts and reenergizes charisma and Berger’s extensive use of motif typologies
permit discovery of potential charismatic points of departure for individual or group agents.
The Problematic Account of ‘Social Structure’ in Berger
Berger stresses that ecstasy makes agency possible. But if one must step outside of
society and routine, how does one actually exit structure? Is it possible that Berger is more
structuralist than he himself admits? Though known as the sociologist of consciousness and
subjectivity, his scaffolding actually presumes a structure of some sort. Indeed it needs a ‘real’
society that then may be exposed as fictitious. His sociology in short may be structure-centered
after all and more reliant on implicit patterns than he admits.
Any empirical-sociological quest to discover unmediated and/or authentic ‘innermeaning’ presents problems however. Individuals either adhere to or distance themselves from
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webs of meaning. Situations in the modern, pluralistic ideological-spiritual market place
facilitate conversion or alternation. Berger’s explanations for the phenomena of conversion and
alternation can only occur by presuming a determinate structure of relations, i.e. meaning
systems.
The Noise of Solemn Assemblies (1961b) is the culmination of Berger’s earliest
conception of agency-structure relations. One detects all of the following: his reliance on Weber,
routinization, charisma, motif research, and his conception of agency as an ecstatic stepping
outside of routine. Yet his analysis confirms that at all times a structure of some sort constrains
thus limiting the empirical agent. Macro-scale American society constrains this even further. For
example, the integrative functions in culture, politics, and the social and psychological
dimensions tend strongly towards equilibrium, and a ‘middle-way’ ethic reflect these larger
structures. He describes structure as dampening opportunities for community that a truly ecstatic
religious individual could experience as empowering individual interests or eccentricities. He
does not however actually provide an account of an empirical social structure compatible with
his spiritual assumption.
For Berger, authenticity demands that individual existence triumph over generalizations,
bad faith, and those fictional alibis upholding society. Berger’s quest to discover those empirical
moments in society where individuals can step outside of the routine in all likelihood succumbs
to his idealistic first principle, i.e. true existence can only be attained outside the existence of
society as such.
Is a Theological Sociology Possible?
The question remains whether or not Berger’s theology and sociology are compatible.
Berger advocates various strategies by which modern Christians can break free of structural
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constraints, e.g. setting up open communities within these structures, or embracing a rebellious,
modern, ‘this-worldy’ ethic. But can Berger logically maintain a sociological theology or
theological sociology? His intentions are apparent:
It is against this backdrop that we must understand the religious phenomenon in
America. And, having attempted to understand it, it is against this same
background that we must ask what the mission of the Christian Church ought to
be in society (1961b: 30).
Perhaps Berger is attempting to reconcile his personal theological convictions with his
apparent high regard for the Enlightenment project. This project envisions a society that will
‘free the man’ and remains the dream of liberal sociology. Berger reminds us of the “demand[]
that sociologists lift their heads occasionally from their computer print-outs to address the larger
issues that gave birth to the discipline” (Redfoot 1986: 118). Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel,
Georg Simmel, and Max Weber, like Berger, appropriate strands of German thought and
champion the freeing aspects of the Protestant conception of human moral freedom. Hegel calls
this the Kantian religion and Weber traces its pedigree to Luther’s concept of the priesthood of
the individual believer. The human sciences (Geisteswissenshaften) promote that spiritual energy
inherent in every individual agent: a spirit that moves, propels, and tantalizes behavior to travel
various indeterminate paths in life. The modern cosmopolitan setting comprises potentially a
new context for these conditions to arise. It is noteworthy then that Berger to this day promotes
the same plural, spiritual marketplace that he first describes in his dissertation. Berger is unafraid
to defend his personal spiritual beliefs, and by so doing the reader remains in dialogue with a
unique consciousness seeking to discover its own path to freedom and truth. It is laudable that he
displays a very meticulous attachment to objectivity and frequently directs the reader to
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recognize those moments when he owns his beliefs, speculations, or mere conjectures, and those
when he decides to actually ‘put on his sociological cap’ so to speak.
Berger’s radical epistemology means that no form of knowledge or data is off the table.
This manner of addressing empirical phenomena (in his own Bergerian way) possibly remains
true to the sociological discipline. His analysis of theological constructions, church behavior, and
religion as an ‘insider’ is also consistent with an objective viewpoint. He views a true
Christianity as one aligned with the liberal disciplines of the Enlightenment, and also with many
aspects of existentialism. This is unproblematic as far as it goes, yet, to delve further is indeed to
enter a realm of faith that betrays both logical and empirical proof.
Concluding Speculative Remarks: Berger’s Battle with Eros
Berger’s (1960) empirical-sociological quest is for a meaningful community within “the
organizational complexity” of “church life”: one not reaching toward the heavens, or steeped in
metaphysical or social alibis (22). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Swedish Lund School and
Anders Nygren’s ([1932]1953) value-free observations provide Berger’s point of departure.
Nygren asserts that Western religious history contains three fundamental motifs: Eros, Nomos,
and Agape. These ideal motif typologies undergird all historical actions, behaviors, and beliefs.
Eros is associated with a Hellenistic tradition that places God’s love external to and/or
metaphysically beyond a worldly reality. Individual and group characteristics focus on self-love.
Agape is that ‘true’ form of Christian love given directly by God and is only accessible under
conditions of faithful freedom. Nomos is that security of feeling under law commonly associated
with Judaism. According to Nygren’s theology the relative prevalence of these motifs provides
clues as to how God’s presence is understood within communities and civilizations. Agape, for
Berger, is given by God in that moment when an individual is truly freed to accept it. He claims
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in the modern age the search for Agape is then the sociological search for communal church
conditions that enable this individual freedom to be expressed (Berger 1960).
Changes in the relative force exerted by a motif correlates with changes in religious
groups, churches, and civilizations. Agape and Eros compete as opposing motifs. Berger uses
Ferdinand Tönnies’ typology of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to further analyze the
consequences over time of this motif conflict between Agape and Eros. A quest for
Gemeinschaft or traditional communal life arises in the midst of Gesellschaft, i.e. urban
individuated life. The latter is often impersonal and bureaucratic, and facilitates behaviors
associated with city life. Another way of defining the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction is to
contrast a rural family unit with that of business or office life.
As a result of the rapid technological growth stemming from the industrial revolution
“our civilization has been subject to an ever-more rapid and thorough” (Berger 1960: 14)
increase in associations, human relations, or sociation (Vergesellschaftung). The sociological
empirical trend is explained as “an age that forces people to live most of their lives in large,
impersonal, bureaucratic structures” where there is a new retreat into suburbia in response to
these forces. The common conception of the Christian church then becomes one of a community
escaping the evils of the modern urban world. A retreat to suburban life is accompanied however
with the ‘guilt’ of not having “neighborly relations” in urban settings (Berger 1960: 16). At the
same time, Christian urban communities manifest guilt and an uneasiness toward their modern
neighbors that for Berger “completely distorts the real question as to what Christian community
ought to be in [a truly] modern society” (ibid., 16). Regardless of what the conditions of
Christian community should be and what types of freedom are possible in modern society,
Berger definitely indicates where he believes a worthwhile agency is not to be found.
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Whatever answer we may come up with, Christian community is certainly not the
establishment of agrarian enclaves within urban culture. There is no reason, other
than that of personal taste, why Christians cannot welcome the possibilities of
highly individuated community that modern society has to offer (ibid, 16).
Hence, Berger’s conundrum: bureaucratic organization will not allow freedom, and neither can a
pretended rural enclave; Berger must therefore identify a structure that permits the agency he
believes can be found within the ‘community’ form of church (though within a modern,
metropolitan setting).
Berger’s definition of community considerably differs from typical sociological
conceptions and possibly betrays his fundamental theological standpoint. Communities are for
him the “social forms in which agape can express itself…the ruralistic image of community,
insofar as it understands itself as Christian can be theologically criticized as confusing eros and
agape” (1960: 17). Rather than a product of mere theological speculation, though, Berger claims
that he can sociologically describe human relations and examine whether or not these group
movements can formulate the conditions necessary for the temporal manifestation of Agape. He
does this with what he calls Max Weber’s “law” of the ‘routinization of charisma’ (ibid., 17).
Berger claims that sociological, empirical, and historical evidence confirms the fact that
whereas the church underpins Eros, the sect facilitates Agape. “The ideal-typical situation in
terms of the sociology of religion is the transition from sect to church…The close community of
believers, sociologically visible in the nascent stage of the movement, now becomes dissipated in
the large structures of ecclesiastical organizations” (ibid., 17). Historical verification of this
routinization effect appears “again and again in church history” and “can be partially interpreted
as the effort to re-discover social forms in which agape could be empirically expressed” (ibid.,
17). Berger, following Anders Nygren’s definition of community, views agape as one type of
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community where “each member bases his actions solely on what he considers the others’ needs
to be…[and] a community totally open to all who wish to enter…[and choosing] all our friends
exclusively by the criterion of who needs us most” (ibid., 17-18). This community would “spell
the end of society and sociability as we know it” (ibid., 18) possibly due to its empirical
impossibility and definitely resulting of Berger’s awareness of an integrated social order. The
contemporary family and American rural retreat is the opposite of this type of community,
however, and therefore agape is “empirically unavailable” due to these rural forms of behavior
he claims are present in middle-class Protestants. Overarching societal functions further reinforce
the Protestant trend to maintain rural and therefore closed communities disconnected from
modern society. Figure 4 displays Berger’s conception of agency.

Agent Stepping Outside of the
Routine in Ecstasy (Ekstasis)

Secular this-worldly ethic modern
metropolis life setting up
communities that allows
individuation

Agency

Agape

Structure

Eros

Nomos
Charismatic Routinization Overtime

Sect

Church

Figure 4 Peter Berger’s Conception of Agency
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Nygren’s terms may appear “strange indeed to a sociologist’s eye,” but church history
and the concept of routinization create those pressures that inspire sectarian movements to arise
in the church in quest of agape (ibid, 20). It is evident that when Berger’s own value-free
assessments end, and his ethical and moral values begin, he is looking for the community, similar
to Barth and Bonhöffer’s, that is secularized, has come of age in the modern world and one that
simultaneously allows individuation and Agape. Given structures that tend toward Eros, Berger
searches for alternative structures of community permitting ecstasy. A social agent in this regard
can only be conceived in Berger’s theory as a spiritual one. It is noteworthy that Berger sees in
theological motifs another empirical artifact in his sociological quest for truth, yet also an
element of faith where one must simply concede ‘these are hinterlands where one cannot go.’
Berger’s failure to identify the conditions for concrete empirical agency are rooted most
directly, though, in these ‘hinterlands.’ Agape presumes an unmediated spiritual encounter free
by definition of any actual historically created product made by and for actual humans as social
beings. Genuine agency must therefore be located outside the historical capacities of actual
agents. Agape is not something actually even accomplished in its basic formulation. Agape is
rooted in a transcendent God-full and God-given moment. It is not a love attainable socially at
all, but only by those whose faith has permitted an actual exit from the societal routine so as to
directly encounter God’s grace as gift.
The fatal irony in Berger’s position is this: genuine agency in history is only finally
attainable by exiting history. It is faith in the idea that true human freedom is a gift not of human
action, but of its surrender. Berger’s deepest theological convictions have led him to posit a
notion of agency that is both non-empirical, and non-attainable. An article of faith—or rather
deduction from faith—“society” is Berger’s story about a fictional story—about “society” and
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“social order”—whose real truth is merely bad faith and its consequences. In the end, Berger’s
story is of a theologian whose sociology stopped short of the very history—empirical, material,
social—it had sought to explain.
It is also in that spirit that Berger’s appropriation of the sociological tradition was
conducted. Berger sought alliances with the radical contingency of sociological fact he identified
in various schools of social psychology. The notion of the fictional society and its precariousness
required a sociology of this sort. In its most radical expressions it provides for Berger what is in
effect a merely contingent array of actors whose convictions, should they change, would
radically rupture the very fabric of the social order. This is truly the existentialistic society, or
what he would soon coin as a ‘humanistic sociology’ (Berger: 1963b).
But this existentializing of social order even applied to traditions positing a notion of
society strictly rooted in definite functional and institutional requisites. On close inspection
though even the solidity of structural functionalism evaporates in Berger’s account to become
nothing but the will to power of a non-truly Christian church and its post-war accommodation
with the forces of technological and cultural modernity.
In the end it is truly irrelevant whether a radically contingent or apparently structuralist
sociology is engaged. Berger’s appropriation of their insights is merely to display the various
flavors society and its theorists and describers have conjured as a means of avoiding the world
that truly exists; its ultimate Creator; and one’s own indescribable mysterious relation to the
Divine outside history.
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